Phenomenal Intentionality in Austrian Philosophy

The main objective of the present project is to investigate these similarities in detail. It aims at showing the continuities and ruptures between the two debates in reassessing the fundamental insights of the school of Brentano concerning intentionality and consciousness in connection with the contemporary debates on these questions in contemporary philosophy of mind. To achieve this, the present project is based on two axes: the historical strain of the research seeks to cast a new perspective on the rediscovery of intentionality in the school of Brentano, insisting on the importance of inner perception for all discussions on intentionality, and at the same time offering a differentiated interpretation of the way they understood the directional aspect of intentionality. The second axis of the present project aims at offering a historically oriented perspective on the contemporary debates on phenomenal intentionality. Concepts like the correctness or accuracy of phenomenal intentionality, narrow intentionality or sensory intentionality in general, which are central for proponents of phenomenal intentionality, have at least partial roots, as we believe, in theories developed in the school of Brentano, for instance on the nature of judgment, on the status of external objects and on the features of sensations. More generally, the project aims at revising certain ideas on the nature of the contribution of Austrian philosophy to the debates over intentionality but also at showing the actuality of the theories developed in the school of Brentano for contemporary philosophy of mind.