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Abstract
The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work.
| Originalsprache | Englisch |
|---|---|
| Fachzeitschrift | Erkenntnis |
| Frühes Online-Datum | 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publikationsstatus | Veröffentlicht - 2022 |
Bibliographische Notiz
Funding Information:This paper profited a lot from discussions at the online workshop “Compatibilist Libertarianism: Advantages and Challenges” in October 2021 organized by Alexander Gebharter and Maria Sekatskaya. I’m grateful to the organizers and participants, especially Christian List, for helpful comments and suggestions. I’m also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for this journal who helped to make the paper better. Thanks to Claire Davis for proof reading. Work on this paper was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P 34,851-G and is part of the research project The Sense of Responsibility Worth Worrying About.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022, The Author(s).
Schlagwörter
- Fre Will
- Responsibility
- Can Do Otherwise
Systematik der Wissenschaftszweige 2012
- 603 Philosophie, Ethik, Religion
Projekte
- 1 Laufend
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The Sense of Responsibility Worth Worrying About: The Sense of Responsibility Worth Worrying About
Menges, L. (Projektleitung)
1/10/21 → 31/08/25
Projekt: Forschung