A análise mereológica dos objetos intencionais em Brentano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The main goal of this article is to analyze the intentional objects in Brentano’s theory of intentionality. I focus on the early Brentano, i.e. on the period between 1874 and 1904, and my analysis is based on Brentano’s mereological account of conscience. I will explore Brentano’s teaching on the different modes of conscience, the intentional correlates, the distinction between real being and existent being as well as the distinction between object and content.
Finally, I will defend the thesis that the ontological status of objects that exist within the intentional correlates and of the represented objects or intentional contents can be seen as neutral – for they are only conceptual or abstract parts according to Brentano’s mereology.
Original languageGerman
Pages (from-to)261-278
JournalRevista de Filosofia: Aurora
Volume2021
Issue number58
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Fields of Science and Technology Classification 2012

  • 603 Philosophy, Ethics, Religion

Cite this