Abstract
The power to control decisions is rarely distributed equally in committees. In a small voting committee, in which members have conflicting interests, we study how the decision right to break ties (formal power) translates into effective control over outcomes (real power). Two controlled experiments show that the level of real power held by the chair is larger than predicted by rational-choice theory. We also provide causal evidence that the legitimacy, but not the salience, of holding formal tie-breaking power affects voting behavior and thus the distribution of real power in the committee. Attitudinal measures related to the perceived attractiveness of the decision right to break ties exhibit a strong asymmetry between the one holding the decision right and those who do not.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 101285 |
Pages (from-to) | 1-15 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Leadership Quarterly |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2019 Elsevier Inc.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Committee
- Laboratory experiment
- Legitimacy
- Power
- Tie-breaking rule
Fields of Science and Technology Classification 2012
- 502 Economics