Why framing effects can be rational

Anton Kühberger

doi:10.1017/S0140525X22001133

Why framing effects can be rational

Anton Kühberger

Psychology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Comment/debate

Abstract

When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task - risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses - applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	e231
Journal	The Behavioral and brain sciences
Volume	45
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22001133
Publication status	Published - 25 Oct 2022

Keywords

Humans
Risk-Taking
Gambling
Affect
Communication
Decision Making
Choice Behavior

Fields of Science and Technology Classification 2012

501 Psychology

Access to Document

10.1017/S0140525X22001133

Cite this

@article{229013612f7441868effd021d2a520d9,

title = "Why framing effects can be rational",

abstract = "When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task - risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses - applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.",

keywords = "Humans, Risk-Taking, Gambling, Affect, Communication, Decision Making, Choice Behavior",

author = "Anton K{\"u}hberger",

year = "2022",

month = oct,

day = "25",

doi = "10.1017/S0140525X22001133",

language = "English",

volume = "45",

pages = "e231",

journal = "The Behavioral and brain sciences",

issn = "0140-525X",

publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why framing effects can be rational

AU - Kühberger, Anton

PY - 2022/10/25

Y1 - 2022/10/25

N2 - When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task - risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses - applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.

AB - When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task - risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses - applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.

KW - Humans

KW - Risk-Taking

KW - Gambling

KW - Affect

KW - Communication

KW - Decision Making

KW - Choice Behavior

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85140533174&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36281892/

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/cbb7e8b2-c96d-32a9-934b-51382dafb35b/

U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X22001133

DO - 10.1017/S0140525X22001133

M3 - Comment/debate

C2 - 36281892

SN - 0140-525X

VL - 45

SP - e231

JO - The Behavioral and brain sciences

JF - The Behavioral and brain sciences

ER -

Why framing effects can be rational

Abstract

Keywords

Fields of Science and Technology Classification 2012

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this